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Abstract: Evolutionary Psychology
(EP) views the human mind as
organized into many modules, each
underpinned by psychological ad-
aptations designed to solve prob-
lems faced by our Pleistocene
ancestors. We argue that the key
tenets of the established EP para-
digm require modification in the
light of recent findings from a
number of disciplines, including
human genetics, evolutionary biol-
ogy, cognitive neuroscience, devel-
opmental psychology, and paleo-
ecology. For instance, many human
genes have been subject to recent
selective sweeps; humans play an
active, constructive role in co-di-
recting their own development and
evolution; and experimental evi-
dence often favours a general
process, rather than a modular
account, of cognition. A redefined
EP could use the theoretical in-
sights of modern evolutionary bi-
ology as a rich source of hypothe-
ses concerning the human mind,
and could exploit novel methods
from a variety of adjacent research
fields.
In the century and a half since Charles
Darwin’s publication of the Origin of Species,
evolutionary theory has become the bedrock
of modern biology; yet, its application to the
human mind remains steeped in controversy
[1–13]. Darwin himself wrote of cognitive
evolution, most notably in The Descent of Man,
where he suggested that like any other trait,
human ‘‘mental faculties’’ are the outcome of
evolution by natural and sexual selection and
insisted that they should be understood in
light of what he called ‘‘common descent’’.
This evolutionary interpretation of human
cognition was taken up in the 1980s by
contemporary evolutionary psychology,
which rapidly became dominated by a
school of thought stemming from the
University of California at Santa Barbara
(see Box 1). The essence of this brand of
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) is neatly
summarized in the famous quote that ‘‘Our
modern skulls house a Stone Age mind’’ [2].
However, many evolutionarily minded
psychologists, evolutionary biologists, and
philosophers of science disagree with the
theoretical proposals put forward by the
Santa Barbara evolutionary psychologists,
and the discipline has been the subject of
intense debates [1,3–13]. Here, we assess
the impact of recent developments in
genetics, evolutionary and developmental
biology, paleoecology, and cognitive sci-
ence on EP and then go on to suggest that
these developments provide new avenues
for research.
Reassessing the Major Tenets of
Evolutionary Psychology
EP is encapsulated by four major tenets
(see Box 1) that have generated consider-
able discussion. Here, we argue that all of
these basic assumptions need to be reas-
sessed in the light of contemporary
evidence.
The Environment of Evolutionary
Adaptedness and Gradualism
EP argues that that human cognitive
processes evolved in response to selection
pressures acting in ancestral conditions—in
an environment of evolutionary adapted-
ness (EEA)—and are not necessarily adap-
tive in a contemporary world that has
changed radically in recent millennia.
From this vantage point, genetic evolution
simply could not keep pace fully with the
extraordinary rate at which human tech-
nology transformed environments. Tied up
with this notion of adaptive lag (or
mismatch between our biology and our
environment) is an emphasis on evolution-
ary gradualism: evolutionary change, par-
ticularly with respect to complex adapta-
tions in the human mind, is deemed to have
occurred slowly; too slowly to have led to
significant genetic change in the few
hundred generations that have elapsed
since the end of the Pleistocene, or even
since the spread of modern humans around
the world over the last 50,000 years.
Recent developments in human genetics
have challenged the concepts of adaptive
lag and gradualism. EP originated in the
early 1980s, when our knowledge of the
human genome was limited and gradualism
dominated evolutionary thinking (although
biologists’ attempts to estimate rates of
selection in nature were in full flow in the
1970s [14], leaving the Santa Barbara
school’s gradualism assumption conten-
tious from the outset). Since then, geneti-
cists have not onlymapped the genome, but
have devised means for detecting which
genes have been subject to recent selection
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[15–19]. There have been substantial
human genetic changes in the last 50,000
years, with possibly as much as 10% of
human genes affected [19]. Events in the
Holocene (the last 10,000 years), particu-
larly the adoption of agriculture, domesti-
cation of animals, and the increases in
human densities that these practices afford-
ed, were a major source of selection on our
species [17–22], and possibly accelerated
human evolution [20,22]. Evidence from
the human genome strongly suggests that
recent human evolution has been affected
by responses to features of the environment
that were constructed by humans, from
culturally facilitated changes in diet, to
aspects of modern living that inadvertently
promoted the spread of diseases [22,23].
Genes expressed in the human brain are
well-represented in this recent selection
[11,12].
Evolutionary biologists have also mea-
sured the rate of response to selection in a
wide variety of animals [14,24], finding
that evolutionary change typically occurs
much faster than hitherto thought. A
recent meta-analysis of 63 studies that
measured the strength of natural selection
in 62 species, including more than 2,500
estimates of selection, concluded that the
median selection gradient (a measure of
the rate of change of fitness with trait
value) was 0.16, which would cause a
quantitative trait to change by one stan-
dard deviation in just 25 generations [24].
If humans exhibit equivalent rates, then
significant genetic evolution would occur
over the course of a few hundred years.
While fast evolution is far from inevitable,
there is nonetheless strong evidence that it
has frequently occurred in humans. EP has
yet to come to terms with the possibility of
recent, rapid genetic changes with their
potential for associated neural rewiring.
Even if we consider the selection
pressures that acted on ancestral human
populations during the Pleistocene epoch
(approximately 1.7 million to 10,000 years
ago), the abstract concept of stable selec-
tion pressures in the EEA is challenged by
recent evidence from paleoecology and
paleoanthropology. The Pleistocene was
apparently far from stable, not only being
variable, but progressively changing in the
pattern of variation [25,26]. The world
experienced by members of the genus
Homo in the early Pleistocene was very
different from that experienced in the late
Pleistocene, and even early anatomical
modern Homo sapiens that lived around
150,000 years ago led very different lives
from Upper Paleolithic people (40,000
years ago) [27–29].
Universalism
EP has also placed emphasis on the
concept of human nature, comprising a
species-specific repertoire of universal,
evolved psychological mechanisms, from
a childhood fear of strangers, to a cheater-
detection mechanism, to a preference for
specific mate characteristics. This putative
universal cognition can be rendered com-
patible with the observed diversity in
human behaviour by recourse to context-
dependent strategies. From this perspec-
tive, the mind shifts between pre-specified
behavioural outputs in response to differ-
ential environmental influences [30,31].
This explanation of human behavioral
variation is also contentious [3,32–34].
The notion of universalism has led to the
view that undergraduates at Western
universities constitute a representative
sample of human nature, a view that has
been subject to criticism from anthropol-
ogists and psychologists [33–35]. More-
over, by EP’s formulation, all epigenetic
and developmental effects simply evoke
alternative genetically pre-specified strate-
gies. Recent trends in developmental
psychology and neuroscience have instead
stressed the malleability of the human
brain, emphasizing how experience tunes
and regulates synaptic connectivity, neural
circuitry and gene expression in the brain,
leading to remarkable plasticity in the
brain’s structural and functional organiza-
tion [36]. Neuroscientists have been aware
since the 1980s that the human brain has
too much architectural complexity for it to
be plausible that genes specify its wiring in
detail [37]; therefore, developmental pro-
cesses carry much of the burden of
establishing neural connections.
In parallel, emerging trends in evolu-
tionary theory, particularly the growth of
developmental systems theory, epigenetic
inheritance, and niche-construction theo-
ry, have placed emphasis on organisms as
Box 1. The Major Tenets of Evolutionary Psychology
According to the Santa Barbara school of Evolutionary Psychology (EP), human
minds are organized into a large number of evolved psychological mechanisms—
psychological adaptations designed to solve recurrent problems faced by our
hunter-gatherer ancestors [30]. These evolutionary psychologists attempt to
provide criteria for ‘‘carving the mind at its natural joints’’ [104], generally by
reverse-engineering from an observable phenomenon to its proposed function.
In the 1980s, four major tenets of EP crystallized, and these ideas became
widespread. While not all evolutionary psychologists endorse the Santa Barbara
perspective, these ideas have nonetheless shaped the broader field, and remain
extremely prevalent.
1. The environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). This concept refers to the
notion that our psychological mechanisms have evolved in response to stable
features of ancestral environments [87]. While the EEA has frequently been
equated with an African Pleistocene savanna, this version of the concept has
been strongly critiqued [66], and the more recent formulation of the EEA concept
presents a broader, less specific theoretical landscape of our past lives, based on
an abstract statistical composite of all relevant past selective environments [105].
2. Gradualism. Evolutionary psychologists argue that minds are built from co-
adapted gene complexes that are unable to respond quickly to selection
[105,106]. When combined with the concept of the EEA, gradualism suggests that
human beings experience an adaptive lag [88], such that evolved psychological
mechanisms may not produce adaptive responses in modern human environ-
ments that have undergone dramatic recent changes [105].
3. Massive modularity. Given that different sets of adaptive problems will have
required different computational solutions, the mind is argued to consist
predominantly of domain-specific, modular programmes [105]. Whether the mind
also contains evolved general-purpose processes remains debated within EP
[104].
4. Universal human nature. The evolved computational programmes in the human
mind are assumed to be responsible for producing a universal (that is, species-
typical) human nature [105]. At the same time, different outcomes of these
programmes are suggested to be triggered by different environmental or social
conditions, leading to the prediction of both universal behavioural outcomes and
locally specified adaptive solutions [105].
.
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active constructors of their environments
[38–40]. The development of an organ-
ism, including the characteristics of its
brain, involves a complex interaction
between genetically inherited information,
epigenetic influences, and learning in
response to constructed features of the
physical and social environment [5,40–
45]. From this viewpoint, the human mind
does not consist of pre-specified pro-
grammes, but is built via a constant
interplay between the individual and its
environment [45,46], a point made by
developmental psychologist Daniel Lehr-
man [47] many years ago. By constructing
their worlds (for example, by building
homes, planting crops, and setting up
social institutions), humans co-direct their
own development and evolution [22,39,
48,49].
The view that a universal genetic
programme underpins human cognition
is also not fully consistent with current
genetic evidence. Humans are less genet-
ically diverse than many species, including
other apes [50], largely because human
effective population sizes were small until
around 70,000 years ago [51,52]. None-
theless, there is enough genetic variation to
have supported considerable adaptive
change in the intervening time, and recent
thinking amongst geneticists is that our
species’ unique reliance on learned behav-
iour and culture may have relaxed allow-
able thresholds for large-scale genomic
diversity [21,53]. Human behavioral ge-
netics has also identified genetic variation
underlying an extensive list of cognitive
and behavioural characteristics [54].
While variation within populations ac-
counts for the bulk of human genetic
variation, around 5%–7% of genetic
differences can be attributed to variation
between populations [55]. Some of the
significant genetic differences between
human populations have arisen from
recent selective events [56,57]. Gene-
culture coevolution may well turn out to
be the characteristic pattern of evolution-
ary change in humans over recent time
spans [22,58] (see Box 2). From this
perspective, cultural practices are likely
to have influenced selection pressures on
the human brain, raising the possibility
that genetic variation could lead to biases
in the human cognitive processing be-
tween, as well as within, populations. In
summary, there is no uniform human
genetic program.
EP’s emphasis on a universal human
nature has hindered its exploitation of new
opportunities to examine human diversity
utilizing evolutionary biology. Contempo-
rary evolution theory makes predictions
about behavioural variation within and
between populations in traits commonly
studied by evolutionary psychologists. For
example, sex differences in mate prefer-
ences constitute a large proportion of EP
research and are generally assumed to
exhibit universal patterns (e.g., [59,60]);
however, sexual selection theory suggests
that a number of factors, such as sex-
biased mortality, population density, and
variation in mate quality, will affect sex
roles (see Box 3). A modern EP would
make greater use of the theoretical insights
of modern evolutionary biology as a
source of testable hypotheses [3,6].
Massive Modularity
EP has proposed that the mind consists
of evolved cognitive modules, a perspec-
tive referred to as the massive modularity
hypothesis [61,62]. Massive modularity is
a somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation of
Fodor’s [63] original concept of modular-
ity. Essentially, Fodor suggested that what
he called input systems (such as those
involved in auditory and visual perception,
but also in language) were modular, i.e.,
operating in relative isolation from each
other. Information from these modular
systems would be passed on to central
systems (involved in problem solving or
thought) that themselves were thought not
to be modular. EP has extended modular-
ity to involve the whole mind/brain.
The thesis of massive modularity is not
supported by the neuroscientific evidence
[64–67]. Firstly, comparative psychology
presents an unassailable case for the
existence of domain-general mechanisms.
The processes of associative learning are
widespread in animals and have general
properties that allow animals to learn
about the causal relationships among a
wide variety of events [68,69]. For in-
stance, a simple learning theory rule,
known as the Rescorla–Wagner rule
[70], has proved extraordinarily useful in
explaining the results of hundreds of
experiments in diverse animals, including
foraging in honeybees, avoidance condi-
tioning in goldfish, and inferential reason-
ing in humans.
Secondly, there is broad involvement of
diverse neural structures in many psycho-
logical processes, and there is feedback
even to the most basic perceptual process-
ing. For instance, the hominid brain has
not only witnessed a proportional expan-
sion of the neocortex, but the neocortex
has become intricately interconnected and
has evolved projections into the medulla
and spinal cord [71]. This has allowed
humans to learn intricate routines of
movement and complex manual tasks,
because the Fodorian executive part of
the brain can directly monitor the fingers
and the feet [71]. The same projections
allow exhibit fine control of the tongue,
vocal chords, and breathing, without
which humans probably could not have
learned to speak [71]. After evaluating the
evidence and consistent with Fodor’s
original proposals, Bolhuis and Macphail
[64] suggested that there is no evidence for
modularity in central systems such as those
involved in learning and memory. With
regard to cognitive mechanisms, more
often than not, data from animal experi-
ments is consistent with a general-process
account rather than an interpretation
involving adaptively specialized cognitive
modules [64,65,67,72].
A large part of EP’s emphasis on massive
modularity drew from artificial intelligence
(AI) research. While the great lesson from AI
research of the 1970s was that domain
specificity was critical to intelligent behav-
iour, the lesson of the newmillennium is that
intelligent agents (such as driverless robotic
cars) require integration and decision-mak-
ing across domains, regularly utilize general-
process tools such as Bayesian analysis,
stochastic modelling, and optimization, and
are responsive to a variety of environmental
cues [73]. However, while AI research has
shifted away from an emphasis on domain
specificity, some evolutionary psychologists
continue to argue that selection would have
favoured predominantly domain-specific
mechanisms (e.g., [74]). In contrast, others
have started to present the case for domain-
general evolved psychological mechanisms
(e.g., [75,76]), and evidence from develop-
mental psychology suggests that domain-
general learning mechanisms frequently
build on knowledge acquired through do-
main-specific perceptual processes and core
cognition [44]. Both domain-specific and
domain-general mechanisms are compatible
with evolutionary theory, and their relative
importance in human information process-
ing will only be revealed through careful
experimentation, leading to a greater un-
derstanding of how the brain works [44].
Towards a New Science of the
Evolution of the Mind
We have reviewed how developments in
a number of scientific fields have called
into question the key tenets of EP.
Fortunately, these developments do not
just create problems for EP, but also
suggest potential solutions. We argue that
the key factor will be the methodological
and conceptual integration of EP with
adjacent fields.
.
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Traditionally, EP has tested hypotheses
using the conventional tools of psychology
(questionnaires, computer-based experi-
ments, etc.). Generally these hypotheses
have a functional perspective—that is, EP
proposes that a particular mechanism
functioned to enhance reproductive suc-
cess in our ancestors. However, Nobel
laureate Niko Tinbergen [77] famously
proposed that understanding behavior
requires comprehension not only of its
function and evolution, but also of its causation
and development [78], and he argued that a
complete understanding of behavior in-
volves addressing all four of these ques-
tions. These distinctions are relevant
because accounts of the evolution of brain
and cognition cannot in themselves ex-
plain the brain’s underlying working
mechanisms [1], since these are logically
distinct questions. While evolutionary
analyses may generate clues as to the
mechanisms of human cognition, these are
best regarded as hypotheses, not estab-
lished explanations, that need to be tested
empirically [1,64,79], and there are in-
stances where such evolutionary hypothe-
ses about mechanisms have had to be
rejected [1]. Here, we ask which of
Tinbergen’s questions is currently ad-
dressed in the field of EP and describe
how EP could expand its focus to provide
a broader and richer understanding of
human behaviour.
Evolutionary psychologists commonly
seek to study how the human mind works
by using knowledge of evolution to
formulate, and sometimes test, hypotheses
concerning the function of cognitive ar-
chitecture. While functional or evolution-
ary considerations cannot be used to test
hypotheses about mechanisms, consider-
ations in one domain can generate hy-
potheses concerning problems in the other
domain. For instance, a theory of the
evolution of a certain cognitive trait may
generate hypotheses as to the mechanisms
of that trait. Evolutionary psychologists
have conducted hundreds of empirical
studies to test the predictions generated
by consideration of evolutionary argu-
ments [80]. However, we should be clear
that such studies do not test the evolution-
ary hypotheses themselves, but rather test
whether the predictions about the psycho-
logical mechanisms have been upheld
[6,81]. For example, the numerous studies
supporting the hypothesis that human
beings are predisposed to detect cheaters
in social situations [74,82] are consistent
with several evolutionary explanations.
While the original researchers reasoned
that cheater detection has resulted from a
selective history of reciprocal altruism
[82], alternative evolutionary explana-
tions, for instance that a history of cultural
group selection has selected for this trait
[83], and non-evolutionary explanations,
are also plausible.
The recent trend within the behavioural
sciences has been away from confirmation
or rejection of a single hypothesis towards
the far more powerful simultaneous eval-
uation of multiple competing statistical
models through model selection proce-
dures [84]. A modern EP would, as
standard practice, conduct empirical stud-
ies designed specifically to test between
multiple competing adaptive and non-
adaptive explanations [13], and would test
the evolutionary historical, as well as the
proximate, aspects of its hypotheses. In the
following sections, we examine how EP
could expand to cover all four of Tinber-
gen’s questions.
i) A modern EP would evaluate the
evolution of a character by constructing and
testing population genetic models, estimat-
ing and measuring responses to selection,
exploring the covariation of phenotypic
traits or genetic variation with putative
selective agents, making comparisons
across species and seeking correlates to
selected traits in the selective environment,
and so forth, as do contemporary evolu-
tionary biologists. In addition to these
established tools, researchers can also
exploit modern comparative statistical
methods applied to cultural and behav-
ioural variation [85] and gene-culture
coevolutionary theory [22,58,83,86] to
reconstruct human evolutionary histories.
The function of reliable aspects of human
cognition, and of consistent behavioural
patterns, can be explored utilizing the
same methods. An important point here is
that researchers are not restricted to
considerations of the current function of
evolved traits, and well-established meth-
ods are available to reconstruct the
evolutionary history of human cognition.
ii) With regard to functional questions,
while EP has stressed the idea that human
beings are adapted to past worlds [87], a
niche-construction perspective argues that
human beings are predicted to build
environments to suit their adaptations,
and to construct solutions to self-imposed
challenges, aided and abetted by the
extraordinary level of adaptive plasticity
Box 2. Gene-Culture Coevolution
Gene-culture coevolutionary theory explores how genetic and cultural processes
interact over evolutionary time [22,58]. Changes in diet afforded by cultural
practices, such as agriculture and the domestication of plants and animals,
provide compelling examples of gene-culture coevolution, demonstrating how
cultural practices have transformed the selection pressures acting on humans and
given rise to some of the genetic differences between human populations. For
instance, there is now little doubt that dairy farming created the selective
environment that favoured the spread of alleles for adult lactose tolerance
[85,107,108]. Another example concerns the evolution of the human amylase
gene: Perry et al. [109] found that copy number of the salivary amylase gene
(AMY1) is positively correlated with salivary amylase protein level and that
individuals from human populations with high-starch diets have, on average,
more AMY1 copies than those with traditionally low-starch diets. Indeed, the
transition to novel food sources with the advent of agriculture and the
colonization of new habitats would appear to have been a major source of
selection on humans [17,110], and several genes related to the metabolism of
carbohydrates, lipids, and phosphates show signals of recent selection [17–19].
More generally, human dispersal and subsequent exposure to novel climates,
aggregation and exposure to new pathogens, and farming and exposure to new
diets are now widely thought to be the source of selection for the spread of many
human alleles [22]. Amongst the overrepresented categories in genome-wide
scans of recent selection are numerous alleles expressed in the human nervous
system and brain [17–19]. This raises the possibility that complex cognition on
which culture is reliant (social intelligence, language, and challenges associated
with constructing and adapting to new environmental conditions) have driven
human brain evolution. Mathematical models exploring how genetic and cultural
processes interact provide strong support for the role of gene-culture coevolution
in human evolution [92,111–115]. Analyses of these models has often revealed
patterns and rates of change that are uncharacteristic of more traditional
population genetic theory [92,114–116]. Gene-culture dynamics are typically
faster and stronger and operate over a broader range of conditions than
conventional evolutionary dynamics [22,83,117,118].
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afforded by our capacities for learning and
culture [88]. While adaptiveness is far
from guaranteed, from this theoretical
perspective humans are expected to expe-
rience far less adaptive lag than anticipat-
ed by EP [88]. If correct, examining the
relationship between evolved psychologi-
cal mechanisms and reproductive success
in modern environments will not neces-
sarily be an unproductive task.
Consistent with this hypothesis is the
observation that humans have experienced
extraordinary levels of population growth,
indicative of increments in absolute fitness,
in the Holocene whilst exposed to modern,
culturally constructed environmental con-
ditions [60]. However, rather than simply
pronouncing that human behaviour is, or
is not, likely to be adaptive, a modern EP
would carry out quantitative analyses
across a multitude of behavioural and
cognitive traits to measure to what extent,
or on what occasions, human behaviour is
currently adaptive (e.g., [89]). We antici-
pate that the formal methods of human
behavioural ecology are likely to be
productive even in modern societies, in
many instances (e.g., [90,91]). Where the
use of optimality models proves unpro-
ductive, cultural evolution and gene-cul-
ture coevolutionary models could be
developed to investigate whether the data
conform to equilibria that are not globally
optimal (e.g., [92]). Researchers could go
on to explore which factors explain this
variation, for instance by measuring,
among diverse traits and across a broad
range of populations, what percentage of
the variance in behaviour is explained by
local ecology and what percentage is better
predicted by cultural history (e.g., [93]).
iii) In order to study the causal mechanisms
underlying the character, researchers can
employ methodologies that are available
to modern cognitive psychologists and
neuroscientists, such as fMRI and related
technology, and take advantage of ad-
vances in genetics. While much EP
research describes human behaviour in
terms of information processing, decision
rules and cognition, the psychological
adaptations can also be described at the
level of the nervous system. Cognitive and
behavioural neuroscientists have amassed
a huge amount of research on the
functioning of the nervous system, includ-
ing the influence of genes on brain
development. However, evolutionary psy-
chologists rarely examine whether their
hypotheses regarding evolved psychologi-
cal mechanisms are supported by what is
known about how the brain works. Here
the role of evolutionary knowledge is less
direct, and again relegated to the gener-
ation of novel hypotheses that can be
tested using established protocols.
Variation in experimental procedures,
patterns of connectivity, differences be-
tween individuals, and comparisons across
species potentially allows researchers to
explore to what extent the circuitry
associated with the focal mechanism is
human specific, and to identify both the
major genes involved and the environ-
mental conditions that regulate their
expression. There is evidence that modern
neuroscience technologies are starting to
be used to test hypotheses generated from
evolutionary theory [94–97], and some
evolutionary psychologists are beginning
to present evolutionary accounts of genetic
variation underlying traits such as person-
ality [98–100]. The aforementioned de-
velopments in cognitive neuroscience and
genetics open up further opportunities for
a broader EP.
iv) As discussed earlier, development is an
extremely important factor in human
cognition, and the human mind is built
via a constant interplay between the
individual and its environment. Recent
work by developmental psychologists dem-
Box 3. Reconsidering the Evolution of Sex Roles
Based on the classic work of Bateman [119] and Trivers [120], EP has predicted sex
differences in the relative competiveness and choosiness of men and women
when seeking mating partners. Men are generally assumed to have been selected
to favour more sexual partners than women and to base their choices on the age,
health, and physical attractiveness of prospective partners; in contrast, women
are assumed to be more choosy than men and to base their judgements on the
willingness of males to invest resources in their offspring [59]. However,
contemporary sexual selection theory [121,122] suggests that a number of
factors, such as sex-biased mortality, population density, and variation in mate
quality, will affect how competitive and choosy males and females are, with sex
roles expected to vary considerably within and between societies. For example,
this theory predicts that, in human beings, both sexes will be choosy when
encounter rates with potential mates are high, particularly where the parental
investment levels of both sexes are large and not too different, and/or where
variation in mate quality of both sexes is high, and males are likely to be choosy in
populations with a female-biased adult sex ratio and considerable paternal
investment.
The prediction that sex roles will vary between populations is borne out in data
on variance in mating and reproductive success in current and historic human
populations, which does not support the notion of a single universal pattern
[123]. In addition, evolutionary psychologists have themselves begun to record
cross-cultural variation in mate preferences and to examine whether variables
such as adult sex ratios and local pathogen loads can explain within- and
between-population variation in mating behaviour (e.g., [31]). However, the EP
perspective generally assumes that context-specific strategies are pre-pro-
grammed within our evolved psychological mechanisms, such that individuals
possess multiple strategies that are differentially elicited by certain external
factors or that individuals develop a particular strategy as a result of
environmental inputs acting on evolved developmental systems during early life
(e.g., [30,60]. Arguably, the more flexible and variable the exhibited behaviour, the
less explanatory power can be attributed to evolved structure in the mind.
An alternative perspective, supported by developmental systems and niche
construction theorists (e.g., [38,39]), posits that the human mind does not consist
solely of pre-specified programmes and that brain development is strongly
influenced by transmitted culture. One of the key contrasts between this
perspective and traditional EP is therefore the role that socially transmitted
culture has to play in the development of the brain and behaviour [32]. For
illustration, consider how the relatively recent developments of agriculture (niche
construction), high-density populations, and the evolution of social stratification
(transmitted culture), have dramatically changed the ecological context of human
mating decisions from what would have occurred in hunter-gatherer societies.
According to the aforementioned theory, the increasing encounter rates that
such practices likely afforded should have led to much greater choosiness in both
modern men and women compared to their Pleistocene ancestors. Modern
evolutionary theory has much to offer evolutionary psychologists who are willing
to eschew a focus on universality.
.
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onstrates how it is possible to detect the
unlearned roots of cognition, such as deep,
explicit conceptual understanding,
through careful experimentation on young
children [44]. Such experiments also
reveal the manner in which culturally
and individually variable concepts emerge,
through domain-general learning akin to
bootstrapping, in response to a culturally
constructed, symbolically encoded envi-
ronments [44]. In principle, all posited
evolved psychological mechanisms, from
fear of snakes to cheater-detection mech-
anisms, could be subject to the same kind
of detailed developmental investigation.
Recent trends in developmental biology
and cognitive neuroscience recognize that
the human brain and behaviour are
shaped to an important extent by individ-
ual and social learning [36]. Hitherto, EP’s
theoretical stance led it to assume domain
specificity in cognition, resulting in the
neglect of opportunities to investigate to
what extent human social and asocial
learning are reliant upon processes that
apply across domains, or the manner in
which cross-domain general learning pro-
cesses build on domain-specific inputs. For
instance, while behavioural innovation is
critical to the survival of animals living in
changing and unpredictable environ-
ments, whether such innovation is chan-
neled in a context specific manner is
unclear. Innovation could instead be
reliant on domain-general mechanisms
expressed in complex cognition, intelli-
gence and learning; for instance, innova-
tion could involve learned behaviour
patterns being adapted to a new domain.
Available evidence suggests the latter
scenario [76,101].
Similarly, EP has engaged in a long-
standing debate with advocates of cultural
evolution over whether human social
learning is governed by evolved content
biases (e.g., choose the sugar-rich food) or
by domain-general context biases (e.g.,
conform to the local norm). There is
sufficient empirical evidence for the de-
ployment of context biases, such as
conformity or prestige bias, to render the
casual dismissal of transmitted culture
counterproductive [102,103]. A broader
EP could actively pursue these questions,
by testing experimentally whether human
social learning is dominated by content or
context biases, and by investigating the
factors that affect reliance on each. The
finding that innovation, social learning,
and other aspects of development are
capable of introducing novelty into phe-
notype design space, thereby establishing
new selective scenarios [39,41,48], opens
up new opportunities for investigating
evolutionary novelty to which social sci-
entists can actively participate.
Conclusions
None of the aforementioned scientific
developments render evolutionary psy-
chology unfeasible; they merely require
that EP should change its daily practice.
The key concepts of EP have led to a series
of widely held assumptions (e.g., that
human behaviour is unlikely to be adap-
tive in modern environments, that cogni-
tion is domain-specific, that there is a
universal human nature), which with the
benefit of hindsight we now know to be
questionable. A modern EP would em-
brace a broader, more open, and multi-
disciplinary theoretical framework, draw-
ing on, rather than being isolated from,
the full repertoire of knowledge and tools
available in adjacent disciplines. Such a
field would embrace the challenge of
exploring empirically, for instance, to what
extent human cognition is domain-general
or domain specific, under what circum-
stances human behaviour is adaptive, how
best to explain variation in human behav-
iour and cognition. The evidence from
adjacent disciplines suggests that, if EP can
reconsider its basic tenets, it will flourish as
a scientific discipline.
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